Still others favour a theoretical criterion, using the term 'policy' (and especially 'science policy') only for the period since 1945, while referring to 'science policy' before 1940 as 'prehistori~'.~ Their argument is based on the fact that the emergence of science policy studies since World War I1 transformed science policy into a coherent set of topics with a distinct theoretical rationale.
The process of structural evolution which transformed 'patronage' into 'policy', as well as the role of policy in the rise of new disciplines, can be clarified by looking at a transitional period when a new research policy, combining features of both traditional 'patronage' and of 'science policy', coincided with the rise of the new discipline of molecular biology. This paper focuses on the origins and structure of a research policy designed to achieve rapid biological progress, and its interaction with those scientific trends which were associated with the 'molecularization' of biology in the 1930s.
In the 1930s' private philanthropic foundations played a major role in the transition from traditional 'patronage' to 'science policy'. In the United States, the foundations, rather than the government, were the major institutional agents concerned with supporting scientific r e~e a r c h .Ĩn European countries, where various degrees of governmental support for science coexisted with support from private foundations, both local and foreign, the foundations were often more active in non-traditional research areas. ' In retrospect, this research policy of private foundations lacked some of the key features of science policy since 1945 (most notably the interaction of strategic and international affairs, especially in connection with the Third Nevertheless, W~r l d ) .~ the research policy instituted by large philanthropic foundations, and especially that of the Rockefeller Foundation in the 1930s, shared a common vision with their later counterparts. In the 1930s, the Rockefeller Foundation's research policy was not only an attempt to provide a firm grip on the course of scientific progress simply for the sake of science, but was also a crucial element in a strategy aimed at maximizing total 'social returns' from s~i e n c e .~ Since 1945, science policy has become a key element in maintaining the international strategic balance, the gross national product and other forms of 'social return '. lo Among the scholars who have examined the activities of the Rockefeller Foundation in the inter-war period, Donald Fisher has argued that the Foundation's support of social sciences in Britain was both intended to preserve, and succeeded in preserving, the social order of capitalist democracy. According to Fisher, the Foundation accomplished this goal by selectively supporting some social sciences (economics, anthropology and international relations) rather than others, as well as by selectively supporting certain approaches within those fields, especially empirical economics and functional anthropology (the latter being closely linked to colonial services). The control of the Rockefeller Foundation over the social sciences in Britain derived, according to Fisher, from the Foundation's position as the major source of support for social sciences, and from its innovative and progressive policy which included the application of a theory of human capital to education."
Similarly, Edward Yoxen, who has examined the Rockefeller Foundation's policy toward biology, has argued that the 'social return' of that policy emerged as the naturalization of power relations in capitalist society. l 2 Robert Kohler and Robert Seidel, who have examined the Foundation's support to biochemistry and physics, respectively, have emphasized its role in preparing the stage for the emergence of 'Big Science' by cultivating entrepreneurs among scientific leaders. l 3 These studies provide important inroads into an understanding of the Foundation's activities in the 1930s. However, they do not examine the actual interaction between the research policy of the Foundation and scientific practice. The impact of policy on practice has often been assumed or inferred (on the basis of such macrolevel indicators as the size of grants) rather than demonstrated in terms of actual (especially long-term) changes in the scientific practice of the grantees. Moreover, the heavy reliance of these studies on the policy documents produced by the Foundation's officers has tended to reflect, rather than reflect upon, the officers' perspective. In some cases, most notably that of Kohler,I4the argument follows a mere reiteration of the view of one Foundation officer. This paper will discuss the impact of the Rockefeller Foundation's policy on three scientific projects pertaining to the rise of molecular biology. The paper also seeks to complement the prevailing perspectives on the emergence of scientific disciplines by retrieving the constitutive dimensions of power. Thus the impact of a research policy on the rise of a new discipline is demonstrated in terms of that policy's impact on new configurations of knowledge and power. Michel Foucault's recent characterization of disciplines as 'general formulas of domination',ls and his description of discourse as articulating power and knowledge simultaneously, offer new insights into the historical structure and function of scientific disciplines as key units of social order and social control. Thus, scientific disciplines can be conceived as institutionally integrating power relationships. These power relations make possible certain discourses and these discourses, in turn, sustain certain power relations. Foucault defines power as a multiplicity of strategies of social hegemony, a definition which is applicable not only to his topic of sexuality but also to the topic of scientific order and the rise of new disciplines within that order:
If sexuality was constituted as an area of investigation, this was only because relations of power had established it as a possible object; and conversely, if power was able to take it as a target, this was because techniques of knowledge and procedures of discourse were capable of investing it. Between techniques of knowledge and strategies of power, there is no exteriority, even if they have specific roles and are linked together on the basis of their difference. We will start, therefore, from what might be called 'local centers' of power-knowledge. . .Relations of power-knowledge are not static forms of distribution, they are 'matrices of transformations '.16 Along these lines, this paper will show that the constitution of molecular biology as a new scientific discipline depended on specific configurations of power and knowledge derived from the disciplines of physics and biology. Therefore, the impact of the Rockefeller Foundation's policy will be seen to consist of an apparent, rather than a real, contribution to the new configuration of physical power and biological knowledge upon which the rise of molecular biology as a new discipline would depend.
Weaver and the Rise of Molecular Biology
The term 'molecular biology' can be traced to neither of the present scientific schools competing for priority rights as founders of the discipline," but to the Rockefeller Foundation's Annual Report for 1938. There, 'molecular biology' was defined in interchangeable terms as the 'biology of molecules' and 'sub-cellular biology'. The novelty of the field was described as resulting from the divisibility of cell biology's traditional unit of analysis, and the opening of a new, more fundamental level of analysis -the sub-cellular, or the molecular. This Report also compared the novelty of molecular biology to novelties in physics. In physics, too, the demonstration of the divisibility of the atom opened a more fundamental level of analysis, and sub-atomic or particle physics came into being. Both fields were described as part of the same enterprise, devoted to finding the 'ultimate littleness of things'. The analogy with physics was extended when the Report emphasized how molecular biology depended on an impressive number of physical technologies.
The author of the 1938 Report was Warren Weaver, at that time Director of the Natural Sciences Division. Thirty years later he drew attention to his pioneering use of the term 'molecular biology'. He emphasized how the $90 million that he funnelled to 'experimental' and 'molecular' biology in the period between 1932 and 1957 had produced the molecular biology of the 1960s. Weaver solicited and obtained testimony from several leading scientists about their personal indebtedness to his policy."
It is understandable that historians of the modern life sciences have discerned a direct link between Weaver's policy and the emergence of molecular biology. For example, Robert Olby's The Path to the Double Helix2" begins and ends with tributes to Weaver. Olby's argument rests on the testimony of W. Lawrence Bragg and Max Delbriick, who acknowledged the importance of Weaver's support in the late 1930s. Yet neither engaged in DNA research, which Olby considers the principal focus of molecular biology. T o the extent that Bragg, Delbriick and other scientists cultivated different conceptions of molecular biology, not related to DNA, Olby seems to suggest that those conceptions were rapidly dismissed in view of the later success story of DNA. Indeed, Olby refrains from considering the question why a DNA-centred conception of molecular biology acquired dominance within the scientific community in the 1960s.*I Kohler has also examined Weaver's activities, and has concluded that 'most of his [Weaver's] projects in "molecular biology" were in [biochemistry]'." It is difficult to see how this confusion of molecular biology with biochemistry, an 'incorporation' tactic used in the late 1960s by competing scientist^,^^ can illuminate the possible impact of the Foundation's policy on either discipline. In the 1930s, 'molecular biology' did not mean biochemistry. Finally, Yoxen has credited Weaver with anticipating the formation of molecular biology as a field, but discusses scientists who were never associated with that part of the Foundation's programme which Weaver named 'molecular biology'. 24 More recently, John Fuerst has highlighted the reductionist character of the Rockefeller Foundation's programme in molecular biology, as part of a general argument which emphasizes the centrality of a 'reductionist intent', while disclaiming the possible importance of a 'holistic' intent.25 In contrast, the present paper provides empirical evidence that non-reductionist intents existed in the early days of molecular biology. It further refines the meaning of reductionism (introduced by Fuerst as an ever-progress-bound 'belief-system') as a complex strategy for maintaining a hierarchical order among physical scientists and biologists, a strategy whose relationship to progress in molecular biology remains elusive.
Therefore, it seems that the precise ways in which the research policy of the Rockefeller Foundation might have affected the course of molecular biology have remained elusive; and that the success story of molecular biology in the 1960s, when it emerged not only as a new scientific discipline but also as a cultural event,26 led both scientists and historians to project the present power structure of molecular biology and its associated conception of truth into the past. For this, two complementary explanations can be adduced.
The first looks to the fact that no one has examined the diverse meanings which the metaphor of 'molecular biology' had acquired at different times and in different places; nor has anyone identified the groups which responded to its symbolic action.27 Thus, it was quite possible for leading scientists who wrote on the origins of molecular biology, or who provided testimony in favour of Weaver's impact, to obscure those meanings which did not relate to the DNA 'story' and the success of molecular biology in the 1960s.
Not unlike Weaver, who had always managed to dismiss his 'controversial grantees', these leading scientists knew that scientific truth could not possibly be open to diverse interpretations. As Foucault has reminded us, truth is produced by multiple constraints and it records the regulated effects of power; moreover, in our society, it is focused on the form of scientific discourse and on the institutions which produce this discourse. 'Truth' is therefore linked to systems of power which produce and sustain it in a circular manner; and it retains the effects of the power which it induces and tacitly renews: La verite n'est pas hors pouvoir ni sans pouvoir . . .La verite est de ce monde; elle y est produite gr2ce a de multiples contraintes. Et elle y dktient des effets regles de pouvoir. Chaque societe a son regime de verite, sa 'politique generale' de la verite. . . . La 'veritk' est liee circulairement a des systemes de pouvoir qui la produisent et la soutiennent, et a des effets de pouvoir qu'elle induit et qui la reconduisent. 'Regime' de la veritk. . . . I1 ne s'agit pas d'affranchir la verite de tout systeme de pouvoir -ce serait une chimere, puisque la verite est elle-m&me pouvoir -mais de detacher le pouvoir de la verite des formes d'hegemonie (sociales, economiques, culturelles) a I'interieur desquelles pour I'instant elle fonctionne.'' Foucault's propositions on the intimate relationship between truth and power suggest to us that the social construction and validation of the one currently accepted concept of molecular biology might have also been the product of power relations within this nascent discipline. Indeed, an analysis of the discourses of leading molecular biologists on the origins and definition of their discipline suggests that the conceptions of molecular biology they publicly endorsed were the product of negotiation among rival factions. Thus, the present conception of molecular biology can be seen as the outcome of power relations between different groups which agreed to share the power derived from having been accepted as early contributors to a scientific success story, even if this meant abandoning the historical and personal 'truth' associated with long-held positions. 29 Second, renewed interest in social and quantitative explanations30 has disposed some historians to an enthusiastic search for instances where scientific disciplines and 'policy' have interacted. Weaver seems to provide the perfect case study of a person whose 'policy' had a direct impact on a 'discipline'. It is thus not surprising to discover that all those who credited Weaver with creating the new discipline of molecular biology by his sheer managerial ingenuity relied heavily on Weaver's own account.
These convergences of professional interests may tell us something about how myths emerge in the history of ~c i e n c e .~' It remains to ask what the Rockefeller Foundation was trying to achieve with regard to biology in the 1930s, if, as I suggest, it was not anticipating the molecular biology of the 1960s? The answer lies partly in Weaver's conception of biological progress, revolving around the concept of 'technology transfer' from the disciplines of physics and chemistry to the discipline of biology.
'Technology Transfer': Classical Physics to Biology
The policy of the Natural Sciences Division for 'Vital Processes' or 'Experimental Biology' emerged after a general reorganization of the various Rockefeller philanthropic boards, which consolidated the Rockefeller Foundation in the period 1928-32. Following internal personnel changes at the executive level, and in response to the dramatic impact of the Great Depression, the Foundation's Trustees decided in April 1933 to shift from their previous strategy of giving large-scale financial support to a few highly meritorious recipients to a strategy of funding many 'targets' on a smaller scale.'* The eligibility of each target was to be judged in terms of the subject's relevance to specific scientific domains, defined as strategic by the Foundation's officers. Previously, no control had been exercised over the large resources given to a few targets, largely because direct administration remained with bodies, such as the National Research Council, outside the Rockefeller Foundation. But this new policy required coordination and control by the Foundation itself. This shift also implied that support would move from large, capital improvements to equipment, materials and research assistants. 33 In 37 Weaver had no biological background, but was soon convinced that biology was the 'science of the future'. His chief sources of information were popular statements by leading scientists and popularizers, including optimistic addresses found in N a t~r e ,~' and repeated before the British Association for the Advancement of S~i e n c e .~The magazine section of the New York Times described the 'borderland between chemistry and the mysteries of life as the area for the most adventurous hope and of possible significance to human knowledge'. Weaver quoted many of these references in his working papers. and the Cambridge philosopher C.D. Broad, whom Hopkins described as unusually acquainted with scientific work. All these authorities not only spoke of biological knowledge as an indicator of social progr;ess, but also claimed that the imbalance resulting from popular support of physical over biological sciences was a dangerous phenomenon impairing human control of knowledge. Biological truth was thought to be equally, if not more, relevant to 'individual conduct and no less to statecraft and social policy' . 43 Weaver's own classical conception of science and technology resonated well with the idea that biology might welcome new investment. He regarded the justification for scientific activity to lie in its technological benefits, including new methods of production, transportation and communication. However, like many an engineer, Weaver credited science with technological benefits which derived from 'an inventive capacity which had little to do with (academic) science'. For him, 'to experiment, explore, enquire and reason was a duty and a clear matter of noblesse oblige'. Weaver ascribed to science a role in guiding moral conduct, making references to the 'adventuresome' and 'spiritual' character of scientific theories in the twentieth century."" Having decided that biology was a proper channel for ensuring the Foundation's quest for a rapid 'social return', Weaver gave a tactical definition of 'biological progress'. He surveyed the opinions of leading scientists by following up the experience of the Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research in New York City, where the collaboration of scientists from different disciplines was especially e n c o~r a g e d .~~ Most of the ten leaders polled agreed that collaboration between biologists and physicists, chemists or mathematicians would be a good idea, but only two (the physiologists-turned-biophysicists Archibald Vivian Hill of the University of London and August Krogh of the University of Copenhagen) recognized explicitly the potential outcome of a union between biology and the exact sciences. Hill stated that much of 'classical' physiology could be worked afresh by accurate physical and chemical methods, but 'only [by] the best brains in physics and chemistry, not the second best', and only after they had been first acclimatized to 'biological methods of thought'.46 Krogh stated that the progress of biology as a measuring science depended on its contact with physical ideas and physical methods, as exemplified in the work of Otto W a r b~r g .~? But Krogh also insisted that prospective collaborators trained in the physical sciences had to possess a 'sympathetic understanding of biological problems'. In Weaver's policy, all such subtleties evaporated. Biology, hitherto described as 'backward, lacking laws and beyond rational analysis', would be required to produce discoverable laws. Embarking on a crusade to save civilization through rapid biological progress, Weaver decided to channel the greater part of his resources into projects in the 'application of physical, chemical and mathematical techniques to "vital processes"', a term that he changed a year later to 'experimental b i~l o g y ' . "~ In his new policy, support would be offered for the use of physical technology on biological n~aterial.~" This process of 'technology transfer' commonly involves a geographical transfer of techniques and associated skills. A transfer succeeds or fails depending on its ability to cope with the skills that are t r a n~f e r r e d .~~ Technology transfer from physics to biology was instituted in the name of progress. In the cases below, a dependence on skills associated with physical science led to a 'colonization' of the 'underdeveloped' area, biology. Their higher prestige ensured that the physicists involved rarely developed an interest in the specific problems of the recipient di~cipline.~' On the other hand, Weaver's policy of 'technology transfer' endowed physicists with resources to manipulate the progress-related technologies, to produce results, and to manage 'biological assistants', who were subordinate to them both socially and intellectually.
Indeed, Foucault's recent characterization of disciplines as 'general formulas of d~m i n a t i o n '~~ has captured the essence of Weaver's policy of technology transfer. In Weaver's policy, physical technologies became instruments of power leading to the domination of biology by physicists who lacked any real interest in biological problems. Their hegemony was ensured because Weaver's policy merely monitored the continuous use of physical technology on biological material, eventually discouraging those who had developed a genuine interest in biological problem^.^'
The financial implications of Weaver's scheme were a more or less rapid reduction in allocations to general support.j4 Increased officer activity in surveying investment opportunities in 'experimental biology' meant many more visits, phone calls, reports and other ways of obtaining informal scientific intelligence on promising sites for i n v e~t m e n t .~~ Weaver's strong expectations of great and rapid social returns from his concentrated investments in 'backward' biology led him constantly to expand the officers' authority at the expense of both the Trustees (the official policymakers) and the scientists (the producers of results). Weaver did so by launching an administrative programme based on small projects and enmeshed in an enormous number of financial and administrative regulations. This strategy achieved an increase in the officers' control over policy-making, since it bestowed on them 'specializing' skills in exercising judgment over accepting or rejecting many small projects.
It must be stressed that following the reorganization of the Rockefeller Foundation in the period 1928-32,the officers acquired a measure of responsibility for policy-making, even though the Trustees remained the official policy-makers. This new responsibility of the officers was exercised at two levels. On the one hand the policy of selective support to specific fields of science demanded a constant survey by the officers of suitable 'investment opportunities' throughout the scientific community. On the other hand, the newly established Officers' Conference had to approve the recommendations of the officers and directors of each Division prior to officially submitting those recommendations to the Trustees for approval. Only the projects approved by the Officers' Conference could be submitted for the Trustees' approval. The Trustees were leading businessmen and scientists who met only twice a year.
The smooth relationship between the Trustees and the officers was ensured by the dual position of the Foundation's President, who served both as Chairman of the (executive) officers and as Chairman of the (policy-making) Board of Trustees. And it was he who balanced the interests of the Trustees in a broad and coherent policy designed t o promote scientific solutions to the then troubling social and economic problems, against the interests of the officers in both establishing their (at least de facto) role as legitimate partners in policy-making, and in promoting specific scientific projects. The inherent tension between the officers' freedom in field negotiations with the prospective grantee-scientists, and the fact that all their promises of investments could be overturned by the Trustees, was especially evident in the activities of a director like Weaver, since Weaver took very seriously the task of furthering scientific progress on a large scale through an international network of tightly controlled small projects in 'experimental biology'. 56 Weaver designated Europe as the chief area for his policy of concentration, not only because previously Europe had received so much less than A m e r i~a ,~' but apparently because 'politically fragmented and individualistic' European science seemed well suited to the type of detailed surveillance via small projects that Weaver had in mind. Within a month of the approval of Weaver's policy proposal at the Trustees meeting on 11 April 1933, he departed for Paris. Touring Europe together with Lauder Jones, officer for European affairs, Weaver scrutinized in seven weeks an impressive array of countries, including Sweden, Norway, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Germany, Hungary and Switzerland. In every country, the two were received with the aristocratic honours befitting representatives of a powerful plutocracy. They did not forget to inform everyone about their new shift in Of special interest are Weaver's diary notes from his visit to Germany. These captured the gloomy and confused atmosphere following the massive dismissals of outstanding scientists by the Nazis. Weaver recorded with great detail the devastating impact of the dismissals (which affected many of the Foundation's grantees), but remained primarily concerned with establishing whether or not the Foundation could still invest in germ an^.^"
The emphasis of the Foundation's Division of Natural Sciences on the 'application of physical, chemical and mathematical techniques t o vital processes' did not go unnoticed. However, in the years 1933-34 no great decisions were made. Only in 1935, following an improvement in the economic environment, did Weaver manage to obtain Trustees' approval for his first long-term investments. The corporate ethos prevailing in the Foundation, which favoured large and safe investments, convinced Weaver that in order to gain the Trustees' confidence for his own idea of distributing 'chicken feed', he also had to demonstrate certain large and safe investments.
Given the 'business' context of Weaver's operation, it is useful to examine the actual implementation of his policy of biological progress in the three long-term investments: William T. Astbury's project on X-ray studies of biological material at the University of Leeds; Linus Pauling's project in structural and bio-organic chemistry at the California Institute of Technology; and Joseph Needham and Conrad H. Waddington's project in physico-chemical morphology at Cambridge University. While Astbury's and Pauling's key roles in anticipating molecular biology have been emphasized by scientists and historians as well as by themselves, Needham's and Waddington's have been curiously ~m i t t e d .~ Ironically, the only project embodying a conception of molecular biology in the 1930s -the project proposed by Needham and Waddington -was precisely the one from which Weaver withheld support.
A Classic Investment: Astbury's 'Evolution' from Textile Physicist to Molecular Biologist
One of the projects which the Foundation's officers recommended before the Board of Trustees in 1935 for long-term support was William T. Astbury's research on the 'application of the X-ray technique to the analysis of biological tissue^'.^' Astbury, since 1928 a textile physicist at the University of Leeds, was first discovered by the Foundation officer in charge of European affairs, Wilbur E. Tisdale. In May 1934, when Tisdale came to Britain for a 'survey of opportunities', he was advised by Sir William Bragg, Astbury's former mentor at the Royal Institution in London, to see Astbury in L e e d~.~* Tisdale was pleased to discover that Astbury, whose position was supported by the local wool industry, had combined such official duties as examining commercial fibres with his own explorations of fibrous biological material -for example, hair, nail and horn. Astbury's major accomplishment by 1934 had been his interpretation of the difference in structure of stretched and unstretched wool by postulating conformational shifts (known as alpha and beta-keratin) at the molecular Astbury's previous endeavours and actual promises to apply his X-ray technique to a wide range of biological material (including various proteins, muscle, nerve, and chromosomes), could not fail to impress Tisdale that Astbury was a superb candidate for longterm Foundation investment. Aside from Astbury, only J.D. Bernal in Cambridge was involved in applying X-ray techniques to complex biological material. But Tisdale remarked that Bernal was 'undependable', because he was involved with so many other things besides managing results, a task that he liked to delegate to his a s s i~t a n t s .~Ãstbury was more manageable since he already had four assistants whose work was geared to produce results which he alone, as the master of the physical X-ray technology, would manage and control.65 Tisdale started his efforts at transforming Astbury into a unique asset of Rockefeller Foundation policy by clearing various administrative hurdles. First, he obtained the cooperation of the ViceChancellor of Leeds University in administering the grant. This procedure was designed to guard the Foundation from charges of interference in university affairs while allowing its officers to retain the sole right to initiate project proposals. Second, Tisdale obtained permission from the Clothworkers Guild, Astbury's official sponsors, for his digression into the domain of biological fibres. Third, he questioned other textile scientists on Astbury's accomplishments, and also scientific leaders in both physics and biology on Astbury's proposed plans. Tisdale mentioned that none was 'adverse to A~t b u r y ' .~ Tisdale concluded his investigations in July 1934 by recommending (as befitted the period of transition 1932-35) a one year grant for $3,000 for equipment of greater power, and for one research assistant. He also mentioned Astbury's suitability for a long-term investment. In 1935, when the officers first ventured into long-term grants, Astbury's one year grant was renewed and extended for three years. In order to ensure an even speed of progress, the new three-year grant was to be spent in equal annual proportions of $10,000 for salaries and $9,000 for materials and equipment. The justification for this grant was given in terms of Astbury's superb profile for the new Foundation policy; his past accomplishments; his need to consolidate his work by securing biologist and chemist assistants; his future plans to extend the X-ray studies to many more biological materials; and, finally, the coherence he brought to the policy itself. Astbury was described as providing a link between the protein studies of other Foundation grantees who had been ap-plying such other technologies as the ultracentrifuge, Raman spectra, and protein chemistry.67
Astbury's compatibility with Foundation policy was reasserted in 1938 when his project was renewed for five years, a procedure which the Foundation continued for twenty years altogether .@ Astbury seemed to be the ideal grantee, believing in the primacy of physical technology in bringing about biological progress. He was keen on 'cooperation' with biologists, by which he meant that he would be provided with biological specimens and updated with regard to necessary biological i n f~r m a t i o n .~~ Furthermore, Astbury handled his relationship with the Foundation's officers in an excellent manner, involving them in his own natural enthusiasm over new results, confiding in them with regard to his administrative problems, and sharing with them information on other scientists, a type of 'intelligence' which the officers valued and frequently solicited.
It was through Astbury that the Foundation's officers were first exposed to the personnel problems associated with their policy of technology transfer from physics to biology. In looking for an assistant to employ on the Foundation grant in 1934, Astbury encountered a scarcity of physicists with a biological background. He also met the distrust of biologists. One prospective assistant declined Astbury's offer on the grounds that he could not see how he could solve the problem of muscle contraction -the biological problem which fascinated him -via Astbury's approach of taking X-ray pictures of such 'unphysiological' material as dried or steam heated muscle.70 Astbury shared his dilemma with Tisdale and both agreed on a technological solution: new and more powerful equipment which would be capable of photographing the muscle in a shorter period of time, perhaps while still alive, so that biologists would not be deterred by the dead status of his material, and question his inferences concerning the mechanism of contraction in the living organism. 71 The Foundation became Astbury's primary source of support in his brave and pioneering battle to get his results accepted as biological evidence, and to gain entry into the biologists' domain. Astbury also faced scepticism from his fellow physicists, who regarded with suspicion his venture into the complex domain of biological material, in which their X-ray techniques were, at that time, still rather i n e f f e~t i v e .~~ Eventually, Astbury ceased to be a 'mere' X-ray crystallographer and started to integrate physical, chemical, and mathematical data which he and his assistants collected on a wide range of biological materials. His use of other physical technologies, such as the electron microscope, also marked his 'evolution' from a former textile physicist to a 'molecular biologist', a species yet unheard of. Astbury acknowledged the trans-disciplinary character of 'molecular biology', which involved, in his vision, X-ray crystallography, geometry, chemistry and biology. 7 3 Astbury's 'evolution' would not have been possible without the continuous Foundation support which created for him an artificial ecology of great comfort. This support made him less dependent on the disciplinary demands of university structure and professional societies, and enabled him to venture into combining resources from several disciplines. Yet, in the absence of similar ecological opportunities for others, Astbury's adventures in 'molecular biology' remained constrained by the narrow power structure which the Foundation consolidated around his transfer of physical technology to biology. By and large, Astbury's orientation to biology remained service-oriented and embodied in his deployment of biological assistants, not as equal partners, but in a subordinate capacity.
Though the Foundation's policy in the 1930s can be termed 'innovative' in Astbury's case, one must still remember that such innovative investments accounted for only a very small fraction of the Foundation's appropriation^.^^ Moreover, the support for Astbury resulted from the officers' ability to present Astbury as a 'safe' investment. Recommendations by Sir William Bragg and A.V. Hill weighed heavily in the officers' evaluation, even though the reasons for those recommendations seemed to have eluded them.
Yet, despite this initial innovative stance, both the Foundation and Astbury failed, in the long run, to keep pace with the changing frontier of molecular biology. Locked into the practice of deploying ever more powerful technologies on biological specimens, a practice advocated and reinforced by his sponsor, for two decades Astbury produced some of the best pictures of proteins and DNA. However, by the early 1950s he had failed to keep abreast of the latest biological findings which could have given meaning to his physical results. This complete reliance on technology transfer as the automatic guarantee for biological progress, the founding principle of Weaver's policy, proved too simplistic. In essence, it blind- For over twenty years, Linus Pauling's project in 'Bio-organic and Structural Chemistry' was a permanent item in the Foundation's portfolio. Its large size made it a 'pioneer' in the transition to the 'Big Science' of the period since 1 9 4 5 .~~a u l i n g ' s project was submitted for long-term support only after the Foundation relaxed its attitude toward investments around 1935. However, the project began in October 1933 when Weaver arrived at Caltech t o survey the investment opportunities and visited the chemistry department.
Weaver was impressed by Pauling who, as Weaver noticed, headed at that time what was 'essentially an institute (in the European sense) of theoretical chemistry'. Pauling and his fifteen collaborators had been studying 'entirely from the chemical point of view' the configuration of molecules by means of X-ray and electron diffraction. Weaver described this work in his visit report as part of the great advance in modern chemistry which was replacing the symbolic by the quantitative. At the end of his visit Weaver was told by Pauling that the structural studies of his group, which so far had been restricted to inorganic compounds, could be extended to organic compounds and eventually to crystalline substances of biological importance, such as haemoglobin."
Shortly after Weaver's visit, Caltech's request for the renewal of its previous grants in physics and chemistry was declined by the Officers' Conference at the Foundation on the grounds that its new policy called for concentration in 'experimental b i~l o g y ' .~~ However, the Foundation singled out Pauling's work as being eligible for a new grant because of the possibility that his structural work might be extended to compounds of biological relevance.80 Indeed, Weaver was aware that Pauling's research programme had at that time only a rather vague biological relevance, but being familiar with the situation at Caltech (having himself taught there for a year in ,R' Weaver seemed confident that Pauling would respond properly to the new Foundation policy. This con-fidence was expressed before a Foundation committee where Weaver found himself compelled to defend the grant to Pauling with historical arguments, comparing Linus Pauling in 1933 to Louis Pasteur in 1850. Weaver's argument was that if Pasteur had had to make a grant application in 1850, he could only have justified it in terms of his interest in chemical structure. Yet it was that chemical work, continued Weaver, which set the stage for Pasteur's life work; through 'brilliant and entirely natural steps' Pasteur followed the route from structural chemistry to his later biological achievements. 82 Having placed his favourite grantee in a proper historical perspective, Weaver continued to watch Pauling's growing interest in biological compounds and channelled him even larger research grants. After the one-year grant of $10,000 in 1933, Pauling obtained a three-year grant of $30,000 in 1934, and a five-to-seven year grant of $250,000 in 1937. By the end of World War I1 Pauling was requesting grants exceeding $1 million.83 Until now, the official explanation for Pauling's digressions into biology had been limited to his interest in curing diseases.84 He was surely no less inspired by the opportunity to join Weaver in the quest for rapid 'biological progress'. 85 By mid-1937, with his three-year grant about to expire, Pauling asked for a renewal. His biological contributions to date had included the measurement of the magnetic susceptibility of blood, explaining the difference found between arterial and venal blood in terms of the different electronic structure of free and haemoglobinbound oxygen. 86 He undertook this work following a casual remark by Glenn Millikan, the son of Caltech's President.*' Pauling's only other work of biological relevance, which was also along structuraltheoretical lines, was a paper with Alfred Mirsky on protein denaturation in terms of the role of hydrogen bonding as a structural stabilizer.** It was this paper that brought Pauling close to the problem of protein structure, a problem around which the work of several Foundation grantees converged in 1936.89 Capitalizing upon the then growing importance of protein structure in the Foundation's policy, Pauling submitted in 1937 a project proposal in 'Bioorganic and Structural chemistry'. His scheme called for an unusually large and long-term grant from the Foundation ($250,000 for five to seven years) for the purpose of establishing an entirely new department of bio-organic chemistry. Bio-organic chemistry held the key to confirming or refuting various chemical links postulated by the then competing theories of protein structure. Of course, the new department was to be subordinated to Pauling's other, chiefly structural, interests, and was devoted to backing his venture into the tricky protein domain.% This scheme was acceptable to the cautious Foundation investor for a number of reasons. First, Weaver had a personal interest in Pauling whom he seemed genuinely to regard as a future Pasteur, and cultivated as a useful source of 'intelligence' on internal politics at Caltech and elsewhere. Second, Weaver was pleased to see Pauling developing work of more concrete biological relevance, especially since protein research had emerged by the end of 1936 as an important element bringing coherence to the Foundation's policy. Third, this coherence was crucial to Weaver's defence of his strategy of funding small projects, which his Trustees had questioned. Fourth, bio-organic chemistry was a field in which the United States lagged behind Europe, and many at the Foundation regarded this situation as unfortunate for 'the richest country in the world'. Efforts to develop distinguished work in this field had failed up to this time, since all the Europeans had refused American offers, while the best Americans had been captured by the drug i n d~s t r y .~' Fifth, Pauling's project was to be at Caltech. The Foundation already had large investments there, having supported both Pauling's structural-chemical studies and the entire biology department, which emphasized genetics in conjunction with biophysics and biochemistry (and as such fell within the Foundation's new policy in 'experimental biology', not as individual projects, but as a whole d e~a r t m e n t ) .~The biology department was led at the time by the Nobel Prize Winner Thomas H. Morgan, who had negotiated Foundation support with Weaver since 1933. Stressing the prospects of collaboration between the two departments could not have touched a more responsive chord. Finally, early in 1937, Pauling became Chairman of the Chemistry Department and also Director of the Chemical Laboratories. He also gained personal access to policy-making at Caltech by joining the Executive Council. Thus, when the Crellin endowment for building a new wing for chemistry at Caltech became available in 1937, it was Pauling who could decide to use the endowment as a matching contribution for a large Foundation grant.93 His position also allowed him to obtain Caltech's commitment to the scheme once the Foundation's grant had expired. Pauling was assisted by the strongly entrepreneurial influence of George E. Hale, Arthur A. Noyes and Robert A. M i l l i k a r~.~Millikan assumed such commitments with greater ease than more conservative university policy-makers. As Pauling remarked, Millikan used to worry only later about fulfilling his many casually given promises.y5
Without documenting further the dramatic activity which surrounded the successful approval of Pauling's grandiose scheme and Weaver's resourcefulness in navigating it through the Foundation's inquisitive channels,96 it is clear that support for this project put Pauling in a unique position. In essence, he commanded integrated resources, on a large scale, in both theoretical-structural and experimental-bio-organic chemistry. The future course of the discourse on protein structure was directly affected by Pauling's grand entry.
Exploring this event more closely, one notes that Pauling's Foundation support was obtained because of policy arguments, none of which pertained to biological relevance. The promised collaboration between Pauling's structural-chemical studies and the adjacent biological department at Caltech was not visible, ten years later, to an observer who was to become a famous molecular biologist. y7 In 1939, the Foundation appointed an external committee to evaluate the effectiveness of the appropriations made under the new policy. The committee rated Pauling as 'excellent'. However, neither Weaver (who presented the data on appropriations) nor the committee classified Pauling's project as being involved in molecular biology. y8 One of Pauling's former associates, and a leading structural chemist in his own right, best captured Pauling's strategy with regard to biological relevance: 'do the chemistry first, and then draw inferences later, if there are any, concerning biology'.99 While this strategy worked well for some time, and was best exemplified by Pauling's discovery of the alpha-helix in 1951, Pauling's personal interpretation of protein structure as the 'secret of life' relied on data from artificial or dead proteins.Im This misfired in the reconceptualization of biology along molecular lines in the 1950s. lo' Pauling, like Astbury and other physical scientists cultivated by the Rockefeller Foundation's policy of biological progress via technology transfer, was slow to develop a genuine interest in biological problems. For Pauling, biological contributions remained an accidental by-product of a primary interest in chemical results. As late as 1953, despite twenty years of Foundation grants intended to bring about biological progress, and the battery of sophisticated physical technologies they provided, both Pauling and Astbury were still neglecting the biological roles of the proteins and DNA which they had been examining.
A Missed Investment: Needham, Waddington and 'Physico-Chemical Morphology' at Cambridge So far we have looked at projects which the Rockefeller Foundation supported for long periods of time because of their superb compatibility with its policy of biological progress via technology transfer from the physical sciences to biology. These projects also qualified as safe investments in terms of the business ethos of the Foundation. This business ethos required the following actions: guarantees from the institutions of grant recipients in the form of 'matching' grants; formal requests for assistance by the authorities of the institutions (even though the initiative to support a project usually came from the Foundation's officers, indicating their willingness to recommend certain projects to the Trustees); and a commitment to continue support of the Foundation's investment even though the Foundation retained the right to withdraw from the venture once its own original commitment came to an end.
In May 1935, following an exploratory trip by Tisdale in 1934, a proposal for an Institute of Mathematico-Physico-Chemical Morphology at Cambridge University was presented to Weaver. In contrast to the preceding examples, this proposal did not qualify as a safe investment. Yet, more than any other Foundation project, the Cambridge-based study embodied a conception of molecular biology. In the aftermath of the theoretical revolution in physics, an avant-garde group of scientists realized that undermining the scientific order dominated by classical physics, and the special interest of quantum physics in ideas of wholes, atomic organization and systems, had created conceptual and epistemological space for a 'new biology' -a biology of organization at the molecular level. '02 The key element in this realization pertained to the fact that in the new scientific order, inspired by quantum physics, the traditional threat of reductionism was greatly minimized.Io3 These diverse talents included: Joseph Henri Woodger, Reader in Biology in the Medical School of the Middlesex Hospital, London; Joseph Needham, Reader in Biochemistry, Conrad H. Waddington, em-bryologist, and J. Desmond Bernal, crystal physicist, all based in Cambridge University; and Dorothy M. Wrinch, an Oxford-based mathematician. '04 Previous contacts between the physical sciences and biology had produced reductionist outcomes in biophysics and biochemistry,'05 whose raison d'Etre was the successful deployment of physical and chemical methods on biological territory. This procedure was deemed both necessary and sufficient to make biology 'scientific'. But the redefinition of the scientific order in the early 1930s led this avant-garde to attempt a non-reductionist redefinition of the biological order along molecular lines. In their efforts, the biological problem of organization became the principal theme.lo6 Their unique collaboration can be traced to the creation of a new phenomenological domain in which a mutual dependence between the physical and biological disciplines became possible. Unlike the other projects, which were to a large extent opportunistic responses to the Foundation's new policy, the Cambridge-based project, in reconceptualizing the biological or'der along non-reductionist molecular lines, preceded the Foundation's initiative in encouraging 'biological progress'.
Early in 1935, the five scientists agreed upon a joint proposal to be presented by Needham to the Rockefeller Foundation. Needham had been approached by Tisdale a year earlier as a suitable prospective grantee.lo7 Their proposal, to create 'An Institute for Mathematico-Physico-Chemical Morphology', called for five divisions, reflecting the chief interests of the members. Yet the proposal emphasized that the participants should rove among the divisions according to their unrestricted theoretical interests in a conception of biology which knew no traditional empirical boundaries. The divisions they envisaged were: 'Chemical Embryology', 'Experimental Morphology', 'Crystal Physics of Biological Comp o u n d s ' , 'Physico-chemical Cytology', and 'Theoretical Biology'. '08 As a group their interests encompassed all levels of biological organization -from the crystals of biological compounds studied by Bernal, to Wrinch's sub-cellular chromosomes, to the supracellular tissues of Waddington and Needham. Woodger, who at that time had already become more interested in the structure of thought than in the structure of fact, would have assigned a logical coherence to their impressive continuum of interests spanning the living and non-living universes. He was proposed as Director of the last and fifth division, which was aptly named. The scheme was to be managed, not hierarchically, but cooperatively, with responsibility divided equally among the five research directors, who would also rotate the chair.Io9 Weaver came to Cambridge in May 1935 to explore these opportunities. Though he never seemed to grasp the philosophical and ideological undercurrents and subtle tie^,"^ he was impressed with the fact that, through its three experimental scientists, the scheme qualified as a clear instance of technology transfer from the physical sciences to biology. After all, his policy was not to monitor the problems which preoccupied the group, but merely to assess whether they transferred technology -the assumed guarantor of biological progress.
On 5 May 1935, Weaver and Tisdale met for several hours with Needham for 'discussions on the proposal. However, they soon concluded that it 'was still young and in a developing stage'."' Although Needham had devoted much thought to the logical perfection of the scheme, he had left the administrative aspects, which concerned the Foundation's officers, rather open. For exarnple, Weaver remarked that it was not clear from the proposal where such an Institute should be physically located, and what should be its relative emphasis on morphological work. It was also unclear what administrative relationship the Institute would bear to institutions with overlapping interests in the Cambridge University area, such as the Departments of Zoology and Biochemistry, the Strangeways Research Laboratory, and others.
Weaver concluded that, in view of these administrative uncertainties, the 'large plan was not under active consideration'. However, in the meantime and until conditions changed, he noted that the Foundation was prepared to provide research assistance on a minor scale."* Within a month, on 4 June 1935, Needham approached the Foundation for research assistance."' Since 1933, Needham's and Waddington's joint research had focused on discovering the secret of biological organization. They had used physico-chemical methods and concepts to explore the implications of the then recent and dramatic discovery that the effects of the 'organizer' (a specific embryonic tissue which upon transplantation could trigger the development of a whole biological system) could also be obtained with denatured material.Il4 As Medawar has remarked, experimental embryology (which included studies of the 'organizer') was equivalent to the 'molecular biology' of the 1930s in terms of its revolutionary potential for solving the then major problem of biology -the problem of biological order.'I5 Once the plan for the Institute failed to materialize, the continuation of this unique research under the auspices of the Foundation hinged on consolidating the collaboration of Needham and Waddington in Cambridge.
On 22 July 1935, the Foundation's officers recommended to Needham and Waddington a grant totalling £600 for the year 1935-36.Ilh Needham, however, remained concerned with the possibility of obtaining support from the Foundation for three to five years. Indeed, he noted in March 1936, following another visit by Tisdale to Cambridge, that such support hinged primarily on the Foundation's insistence on being formally approached by the University authorities -or, as he put it, '[The Foundation] will do nothing immediately itself, but if the University were to approach them, the situation would, of course, be quite different'."' Obtaining the approval of the university for their project was not a simple matter. First, their personal reputation as 'radicals' was a handicap. Second, Gowland Hopkins, who had officially to sponsor the proposals, believed both in decentralization in university affairs and in the right of a university to accept gifts, not to solicit them. Third, the university authorities considered Needham's initiative and prolonged negotiations with the Foundation to be 'presumptive' for a university officer in a junior position.Il8
Late in 1936, Needham and Waddington realized that the university would not approach the Foundation on their behalf. They also surmised that their joint research could not properly develop in a discipline-bound university structure, where each of them belonged to a different department, and neither department could accommodate their essential collaboration. Therefore, they decided to move their research to the adjacent Strangeways Laboratory in Cambridge, a privately endowed research institution with no official links to the university, and where Waddington had been welcomed for several years as an 'honorary embryologist'. Needham informed Tisdale of their intention late in November 1936, and on 14 December 1936 Tisdale was approached by Honor Fell (who was Director of the Strangeways Research Laboratory, and known in Foundation quarters as an 'excellent scientist and administrator'). She wrote that she strongly supported Needham's and Waddington's desire to relocate their research in her laboratory. 'IY To be sure, if the Rockefeller Foundation's goal had been primarily the support of 'molecular biology', it would have approved the solution offered by Director Fell and allowed Needham and Waddington to receive their projected Foundation support through the Strangeways Laboratory. Both Tisdale and Weaver were aware that Needham and Waddington had unique qualifications and deserved priority in terms of the Foundation's policy. Thus, in a letter to Weaver dated 12 July 1937, Tisdale stated that 'Waddington is without question the best embryologist in England and Needharn has qualifications which I do not believe are duplicated anywhere'. He stressed that Needham's 'encyclopedic knowledge of biology and the synthesis which he performs between biology and chemistry are so far as I know quite unique'. In the same letter Tisdale also explained the rationale for transferring the research of Needham and Waddington from Cambridge University. lZO On 19 August 1937, Weaver informed Tisdale that he had discussed the 'entire Cambridge situation' with Raymond Fosdick, the Foundation's President.121 Thus, he continued, they saw no problem with a construction item also presented by the Strangeways Laboratory. With respect to Needham's and Waddington's research, appended to the Strangeways' request, Weaver stated that he wished to consider both items at the same time.
Coming to the crux of the matter, Weaver confessed that he was disturbed by the 'English attitude to Needham'. This turned out to mean the adverse opinions of Sir Henry Dale, Secretary of the Royal Society, and of Sir Edward Mellanby, Secretary of the Medical Research Council. 12* 'I would hate to go ahead if Sir Henry Dale or Sir Edward Mellanby would be likely subsequently to take the position that we made a mistake.' In view of these doubts, Weaver asked Tisdale to collect an 'expression of European opinion' about Needham and Waddington. At the same time, Weaver added, he would 'canvass' American opinion on them. Reporting to Tisdale on 22 November 1937 on the tortuous fate of Needham's and Waddington's research proposal, Weaver discussed the conflicting opinions of the fifteen advisers. This detailed argumentation revealed a great deal about Weaver's approach, and especially highlighted the problems of policy-making in innovative, and thus controversial, research. l Z 3 First, Weaver understood that the deeply divided opinion reflected the fact that Needham and Waddington were 'working in the "no man's land" between two more orthodox disciplines', and thus were 'viewed somewhat skeptically by each'.'24 The deep conflict over scientific authority stirred up by their research in 'physico-chemical morphology' was largely missed by Weaver, despite the detailed comments of many of the advisers who represented 'orthodox' disciplines on both sides. Weaver reaffirmed his belief in objective criteria for judging researchers, despite the fact that in 'no man's land' so-called objective criteria were evidently not applicable.
Second, Weaver was well aware that a great deal of the divided opinion on Needham could be attributed to Needham's personal characteristics, to his philosophical and historical interests, and to the fact that tensions between the referees consulted affected their judgment. To be sure, Weaver realized that such divided opinion could be of no use in decision-making. Only consensus could serve as the necessary device for legitimizing a given decision. Presented with this unexpected situation he thought he had no choice but to ignore the scientist-advisers' conflicting opinions altogether. Under these circumstances, Weaver felt free to give decisive weight to the opinions of three people -Dale, Mellanby, and Professor H.R.
Dean, then Vice-Chancellor of Cambridge University -who had all made it clear that they had little interest in supporting Needham.Iz5 As Weaver explained, in view of the 'very considerable importance in the general strategy of English science' of these three men, a decision by the Foundation to support Needham and Waddington on a large scale and for a long term, might be looked upon as a mistake. More importantly, these three might interpret such an action as proof that the Foundation ignored their advice and thus refuse to give further advice in the future. In concluding his letter, Weaver informed Tisdale that three days earlier, on 19 November 1937, the Foundation had approved $32,830 for the building and equipping of an additional wing at the Strangeways Laboratory, while refusing to grant support for In retrospect this decision raised serious questions concerning the role of the Foundation. In this instance, when a real decision had to be made, and a scientifically innovative project could not be simultaneously projected as a safe investment, the Foundation failed to respond to its own policy guidelines. The Foundation's own conception of biological progress, regardless of the merit it might have had, was soon abandoned in the light of constraints which were more imaginary than real. One can only conclude that Weaver's personal desire to establish himself as a science statesman on an equal footing with people like Dale and Mellanby may have played a decisive role in his decision.I2'
Conclusions
These three projects illustrate certain key features of the Foundation's policy of biological progress in the 1930s. These included a narrow technological definition of eligibility for support that endowed physical scientists with the capacity to colonize biology without ever developing an interest in, or an understanding of, its conceptual problems; a strong emphasis on elitist considerations which favoured established individuals at prestigious places; and a corporate ethos which bent funding strategies towards 'safe investments', diverting support from innovative but institutionally insecure undertakings.
That these features characterized Foundation policy as a whole finds ample support in the Report of the Committee of Appraisal which the Foundation nominated late in 1938 to evaluate the effectiveness of its appropriations in Natural Sciences during the period April 1933-November 1938.12* This Committee, whose seven members were (all but one) biophysicists, biochemists or 'experimental biologists' at commented Ivy League u n i~e r s i t i e s , '~~ favourably on the choice of 'experimental biology' as the field of concentration and was impressed with Weaver's success in supporting outstanding individuals. But the Committee's Report also reveals strong reservations about Weaver's strategy. The Committee noticed his heavy emphasis on safe investments as well as the scarcity of support for exploratory efforts, where the chance for failure was greater but where Foundation support could have had a strong innovative impact. Needham's and Waddington's project in 'Physico-chemical Morphology' stands out clearly as precisely such as instance. There were probably more, but the Committee remarked that it found itself handicapped in evaluating specific cases which ought to have been supported but were no!, since Weaver denied it access to information on projects which he had rejected.
The most revealing comment made by the Committee pertained to the Foundation's potential influence upon innovative trends in molecular biology. As a result of its emphasis on technology transfer from the physical sciences to biology, Foundation policy could support precisely those innovations which, like molecular biology, could not fit into the university context, where careers depended on demonstrating commitment to an orthodox discipline. By and large, the Foundation missed that unique opportunity because of its overwhelming concern with safe investments and guarantees for institutional security. Indeed, the Committee rated as uniquely innovative four projects in molecular biology, with a total funding amounting to only $100,000. At that time, the total allocations of the Natural Sciences Division were in the range of $5 million. 130 A number of factors prevented the Foundation's policy from fulfilling its unique potential for sustaining innovative trends in molecular biology. First, Weaver's strong vision of correcting the imbalance in the control of the physical and biological sciences, and his expectations for great and rapid 'social returns', led him to invest heavily in the transfer of physical technologies to 'backward biology'. But transferring physical technologies to a new arena proved too narrow as the conceptual basis for a research policy, and lacked the basic understanding that people work on problems; they do not merely use techniques.
Moreover, since Weaver's policy did not exercise any influence over the choice of problems, the likelihood that a genuine collaboration would develop between the physical scientists (who controlled the production of results because of their exclusive mastery of skills -the bottleneck in any technology transfer) and biologists (who possessed only the problems) was very small indeed. Instead of collaboration, Weaver's policy emphasized the colonization of biology by physical scientists.
This decoupling of the power to produce results from the knowledge to identify biological problems prevented Weaver's policy from having a more important impact on molecular biology.I3l As it happened, Weaver's policy in the 1930s coincided with scientific and philosophical trends moving toward molecular biology. These trends stimulated various scientists to become interested in biology from a new molecular perspective. Since they all needed some equipment to follow their problems experimentally, there was no visible gap between Weaver's primary interest in technology transfer from physics to biology and their need to acquire new equipment and assistance as part of a comprehensive problem-solving strategy. It was only necessary to stress the 'equipment' aspect in making the grant application.
This configuration of circumstances explains why, in the midand late-1930s, all the avant-garde in protein studies -at that time the focus of discourse in molecular biology -was composed of Rockefeller Foundation grantees. By the end of 1936 Weaver could rightly boast that his division sponsored protein research all over the world from a variety of disciplinary perspectives. Some of these studies Weaver could and did attribute to the direct influence of his policy. 132 This initial innovative potential of Weaver's policy was soon eroded by constraints within the Foundation. Weaver's strong expectations for rapid social returns from his concentrated investments in 'backward' biology led him to expand the officers' authority at the expense of both the Trustees and scientists. But rather than concentrating on supporting innovative trends, Weaver sought safe investments. Most of the Foundation's resources supported ventures directed by established leaders. To be sure, when Weaver thought he had collected sufficient evidence of this kind, he pressed for the appointment of the Committee of Appraisal. The Committee's Report highlighted Weaver's 'statesmanlike' pronouncements and activities. Ultimately, it was responsible for the continuation of the same policy across an entire g e n e r a t i~n . '~~ If the Rockefeller Foundation was impressed by its own rhetoric and managed to advance clever entrepreneurs, its historical relevance for future molecular biology was nevertheless real. While none of its long-term grantees pioneered a redefinition of biology along molecular lines, Foundation grants stabilized not only their personal careers but also established their institutions as training centres for users of physical technologies on biological materials. The presence of these 'users' in growing numbers colonized biology in the name of a mastery of 'progress defining' technologies. Their sheer numbers eventually established a new social reality, which claimed the name 'biology' -albeit preceded by the increasingly metaphoric adjective 'molecular' -for individuals who had little knowledge of biology, but who had mastered powerful physical technologies in search of results to sustain careers.
However, the period since 1945 has also seen the emergence of a new ecology in which genuine collaboration between the representatives of different disciplines has been made p0ssib1e.I'~ Indeed, many of the results produced by Weaver's grantees were given meaning only in this period. The subsequent conceptual redefinition of biology along molecular lines arose not only from new theoretical efforts and ingenious uses of previously available results: first and foremost, it depended on recoupling physical power with the knowledge of basic biological problems, so as to produce significant results. As the historical lessons of the 1930s demonstrated, this recoupling was a necessary prerequisite for the articulation of a revolutionary discourse in molecular biology. (New York: Wiley-Interscience, 1976) , which documents intellectual and social aspects in the rise of radioastronomy as a discipline in Britain (Chapters 1-6and 7-10 respectively). However, this impressive and balanced record of both intellectual and social dimensions of a new discipline does not attempt to explain the very correlations between these two dimensions which the authors document so comprehensively. Recently, Mulkay has attempted to integrate the social and in-(Cambridge: Heffer and Sons, 1949); Needham, 'Frederick Gowland Hopkins', Perspectives in Biology and Medicine, Vol. 6 (1962) , 2-46; N.W. Pirie, 'A Reminiscence of Sir Frederick Gowland Hopkins, 1861 -1947 ', Trends in Biochemical Sciences, Vol. 4 (1979 42. Following the collapse of the gold standard in 1931, Britain was governed by a National coalition with a Conservative majority led by the Labour Prime Minister. This arrangement decoupled power and responsibility and led to four years of instability and indecisive policies. In this context, dramatized by the Hunger Marches, many scientific authorities looked upon biology as a saviour.
NOTES
43. Weaver's extensive quotations from Hopkins's address included such key paragraphs as Hopkins's reiteration of Broad's claims that further mental progress depended on 'our getting an adequate knowledge and control of life and mind before the combination of ignorance on these subjects with knowledge of physics and chemistry wrecks the whole social system. . .physics and death have a long start over biology and life', and are found in (RAC-915:1:7), 'W. Weaver, The Science of Man, 29 November 1933'; see also , 'W. Weaver, Modern Biology, 22 March 1934'. 44. Weaver, 'Modern Biology', op, cit. note 43. Weaver's reference to modern physical theory as 'adventuresome and spiritual' was a reminder of his life-long hostility to quantum physics. Weaver came to regard quantum physics as a personal threat because it was incompatible with electromagnetics, his field of professional competence, and a field which represented an orderly expression of classical mathematical methods. The Foundation's position gave Weaver a timely opportunity to remove himself respectfully from his outdated endeavours in the shadow of quantum physics, while enabling him, at the same time, to direct scientific progress along classical lines. See also Weaver's autobiography, op. cit. note 37. 45. On the Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research and its emphasis on collaboration across traditional academic divisions of knowledge, see R. Dubos, The Professor, The Institute and DNA (New York: Rockefeller University Press, 1976). Weaver's reliance on the experience of the Rockefeller Institute in drafting his 'new' programme may explain why his chief opponent in the Rockefeller Foundation, Simon Flexner -the architect of the Rockefeller Institute and a Trustee of the Rockefeller Foundation (who was at that time on the verge of retiring) -insisted before the President of the Rockefeller Foundation that Weaver's plan was neither 'new' nor was it conducive to scientific progress (because of its detailed surveillance of scientists by the Foundation's officers, which Weaver proposed as the 'tactical' aspect of his 'policy'); see 
